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Abstract
We discuss a computational model of quantiﬁer veriﬁcation. It predicts that there is no
eﬀect of monotonicity on the veriﬁcation of numerical quantiﬁers but only the interaction
of monotonicty and sentential truth-values. Moreover, it predicts no monotonicity or inter-
action with truth-values eﬀects for proportional quantiﬁers. We present an experimental
study supporting the predictions of the computational model. We argue that the role
of the interaction between monotonicty and sentential truth-values as well as the diﬀer-
ences between various quantiﬁer classes (numerical vs. proportional) have been regularly
overlooked in the literature.
1 Introduction
Monotonicity is considered to be one of the key properties of languages both in logic and linguistics.
Barwise and Cooper [1] even suggested that monotonicity is one of the semantic universals: the simplest
noun phrases of any natural language express monotone quantiﬁers or conjunctions of monotone quan-
tiﬁers. They have also noted that monotonicity relates to the intuitive truth-value checking procedures
for quantiﬁed sentences. For example, imagine a parking lot ﬁlled with cars. To verify an upward mono-
tone (increasing) sentence ‘More than seven cars are green’, you need to ﬁnd at least eight green cars (a
so-called witness set in Barwise’s and Cooper’s terminology). For a downward monotone (decreasing)
sentence, e.g., ‘Fewer than eight cars are red’ you must check all the cars and make sure that there are
no more than seven green cars. Based on the intuitive complexity of these procedures, Barwise and
Cooper predicted that ‘response latencies for veriﬁcation tasks involving decreasing quantiﬁers would
be somewhat greater than for increasing quantiﬁers’ (p. 192).
It seems that [1] has overlooked the truth-value of the sentence as an important aspect of the
veriﬁcation complexity. For instance, if the upward monotone sentence is true, then indeed one needs
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1to just ﬁnd any witness set; otherwise, when the sentence is false, one needs to check all the cars and
make sure that really not more than 7 of them are green. If you can perceptually quickly identify the
set satisfying the predicate in question, e.g., the set of all green cars, then for true upward monotone
quantiﬁer it will take more counting than for the corresponding false quantiﬁer to judge whether the set
is ‘large enough’. However, for the downward monotone sentence the situation is exactly the opposite.
Moreover, intuitively, false (resp. true) instances of an upward monotone sentence are equally hard as
true (resp. false) instances of an downward monotone sentence. Therefore, it seems that we should
rather expect the eﬀect of interaction between monotonicity and truth-value than pure monotonicity to
have an impact on the veriﬁcation complexity.
Thinking about quantiﬁer veriﬁcation in terms of computations [2, 8] can help us to clarify the
intuitions about the inﬂuence of monotonicity on veriﬁcation, and its interaction with truth-values:
Sentences with upward monotone numerical quantiﬁers, e.g., ‘more than seven’, should take longer
to process when they are true than when they are false. For true ‘more than seven’ subjects need to
count up to eight while for the false sentences only up to seven. In case of the sentences’ containing
downward monotone numerical quantiﬁers, like ‘fewer than eight’, the relationship is reversed. This
hypothesis directly improves on [1] by taking into account the interaction between monotonicity and
truth-value.
Proportional quantiﬁers should be more diﬃcult, as the minimal veriﬁcation procedure triggered
by them is cognitively more complex [6, 7, 9–13]. It should be the case even in our experimental setting
where ‘more than half’ (‘less than half’) and ‘more than seven’ (‘less than eight’) are denotationally
equivalent. The reason is that the corresponding procedure is triggered automatically rather by the
linguistic form than the situation to be judged. Moreover, in the case of proportional quantiﬁers,
subjects need to always compare all elements, no matter whether the sentences are true or false, and
so there should be no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the processing diﬃculty between the upward and the
downward monotone proportional quantiﬁers, not even when taking into account truth-values.
2 Experiment
Sixty nine native Polish-speaking adults took part in the study (31 male and 38 female). They were
volunteers from the University of Warsaw undergraduate population. The mean age was 21.42 years
(SD = 3.22) with a range of 18–30 years. Each subject was tested individually and was given a small
ﬁnancial reward for participation in the study.
The task used in the study consisted of sixteen grammatically simple sentences in Polish, containing
a quantiﬁer that probed a color feature of a car in a display. Each picture contained ﬁfteen objects
in two colors. Four diﬀerent quantiﬁers were presented to each subject in four trials. The quantiﬁers
were: fewer than eight, more than seven (numerical of high rank), fewer than half, more than half
(proportional).
For each quantiﬁer, half of the sentences were true. The sentences were accompanied by pictures
with a quantity of target items near the criterion for validating or falsifying the proposition, therefore
requiring a precise judgment (e.g., seven targets in ‘fewer than half’). In each quantiﬁer problem, ﬁrstthe proposition appeared in the middle of a screen, followed by a blank screen (500 ms) and stimulus
array containing 15 randomly distributed cars. Hence, within each trial, the sentence and the picture
were presented separately. We recorded then the time used for reading the sentence and the time used
for veriﬁcation with the picture. Debrieﬁng, that followed the experiment, revealed that none of the
participants were aware that each picture consisted of ﬁfteen objects.
The stimulus arrays were presented for 15000 ms. Within this time, the subjects were asked to
decide if the proposition accurately described the presented picture. They responded by pressing the
buttons referring to the ﬁrst letters of the Polish words for ‘true’ (‘p’) and ‘false’ (‘f’). All stimuli were
counterbalanced and randomly distributed throughout the experiment.
2.1 Results
In this study, the sentence was presented before the picture was displayed, hence the true-false condi-
tions were not included in the analysis. ANOVA with type of quantiﬁer (2 levels: numerical, propor-
tional), and monotonicity (2 levels: upward, downward) as the two within-subject factors was used to
examine the diﬀerences in mean reaction times of sentence mean reading time (see Table 1 for means
and standard deviations). There were no signiﬁcant eﬀects or interactions between the factors.
Table 1: Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the reading time in milliseconds of each
quantiﬁer
Quantiﬁer M SD
More than seven 4054 1992
Fewer than eight 4345 2913
More than half 4459 2907
Fewer than half 4742 2863
Further, the times needed to verify the quantiﬁers were compared. ANOVA with type of quantiﬁer
(2 levels: numerical, proportional), monotonicity (2 levels: upward, downward), and the statement’s
truth-value (2 levels: true, false) as three within-subject factors was used to examine diﬀerences in
mean reaction times of sentence-picture veriﬁcation (see Table 2).
The analysis indicated signiﬁcant main eﬀects of quantiﬁer (F(1, 68) = 146.73, p < 0:001, p
2=0.68)
and monotonicity (F(1, 68) = 6.73, p = 0:012, p
2=0.09), as well as the following interactions: quan-
tiﬁer  monotonicity (F(1, 68) = 13.32, p < 0:001, p
2=0.16), quantiﬁer  truth (F(1, 68) = 11.58,
p = 0:005, p
2=0.15), monotonicity  truth (F(1, 68) = 7.93, p = 0:006, p
2=0.10), and quantiﬁer 
monotonicity  truth (F(1, 68) = 12.64, p < 0:001, p
2=0.16) (see Figure 1).
Analyzing the latter interaction eﬀect, we compared the diﬀerences within each type of quanti-
ﬁer. We performed ANOVA with monotonicity and truth-value as two within-subject factors for the
numerical and proportional quantiﬁers separately.
In the case of the numerical quantiﬁers, we found signiﬁcant eﬀects of monotonicity (F(1, 68)
= 43.61, p < 0:001, p
2=0.40), truth (F(1, 68) = 13.01, p = 0:001, p
2=0.16) and the interaction
monotonicity  truth (F(1, 68) = 37.54, p < 0:001, p
2=0.36). Pairwise comparisons among meansTable 2: Means (M) and standard deviations (SD) of the veriﬁcation time in milliseconds of
each quantiﬁer with respect to monotonicity and truth-value.
Quantiﬁer M SD
More than seven True 3793 1241
False 3360 1218
Overall 3577 964
Fewer than eight True 3626 1296
False 5029 1833
Overall 4327 1307
More than half True 6511 2454
False 6475 2195
Overall 6493 1959
Fewer than half True 6509 2378
False 6084 2464
Overall 6296 2090
Figure 1: Average reaction time in milliseconds of each experimental condition. Note Error
bars are for 95% intervals.
(with LSD test) revealed that the false ‘fewer than eight’ were processed longer than any other quantiﬁer,
while false ‘more than seven’ were performed the fastest. Moreover, there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between both true conditions (p > 0:05).
There were no signiﬁcant diﬀerences within proportional quantiﬁers (p > 0:05).
We also analyzed the main eﬀect of the quantiﬁer type. The analysis revealed that proportional
quantiﬁers (M=6395, SD=1832) were processed longer than numerical (M=3952, SD=1069).
The accuracy analysis revealed only one signiﬁcant eﬀect of quantiﬁer type (F(1, 68) = 20.23,
p < 0:001, p
2=0.23): proportional quantiﬁers were more diﬃcult (M=.85, SD=.02) than numericalquantiﬁers (M=.94, SD=.01).
Summing up, we can conclude that there are no diﬀerences within proportional quantiﬁers as far
as the monotonicity and truth is concerned. With regards to the numerical sentences, their diﬃculty
increased as follows: false ‘more than seven’, both true ‘more than seven’ and ‘fewer than eight’ (equal),
and false ‘fewer than eight’. Finally, the proportional statements were generally more diﬃcult than the
numerical.
3 Discussion
We have examined the time needed to process sentences containing quantiﬁers. The quantiﬁers we
have studied diﬀered in their computational complexity, monotonicity, and true-false conditions. The
results have conﬁrmed the complexity hypothesis derived from the computational model. As predicted,
sentences with the quantiﬁer ‘more than seven’ were processed faster when they were false. In the case
of ‘fewer than eight’ true sentences were easier to process than false sentences. In other words, we found
an interaction eﬀect between monotonicity and truth-value that reﬂects the eﬀect of counting in the
case of numerical quantiﬁers. Moreover, our data indicated that there was no signiﬁcant monotonicity
eﬀect within the proportional quantiﬁers. Again, this is in agreement with the computational theory,
according to which the mental strategies for the veriﬁcation of proportional quantiﬁers resemble the
push-down automata algorithm [2].
The running of the procedure does not diﬀer between the upward monotone case ‘more than half’
and the corresponding downward monotone quantiﬁer ‘less than half’. Furthermore, the complexity
of the computation is similar between true and false instances of the proportional sentences. In both
cases, one needs to compute and compare the cardinalities of two sets that cover the whole universe.
These two facts explain why we found no eﬀect of monotonicty or truth-value in the case of proportional
quantiﬁers.
The average diﬀerence in reaction time was additionally consistent with the hypothesis that quan-
tiﬁers trigger the corresponding minimal computation (counting up to seven or eight). Therefore, our
research contributes another argument in favor of the cognitive plausibility of the automata-theoretic
model of quantiﬁer veriﬁcation [2]. Furthermore, we observed that, in general, proportional quantiﬁers
are more diﬃcult than numerical quantiﬁers, which is again consistent with the theory that predicts a
complexity diﬀerence between numerical and proportional quantiﬁers.
As we have already extensively justiﬁed throughout the introduction, our computational perspective
brings a reﬁnement to the theory proposed in [1]. Namely, we predicted and experimentally found an
interaction eﬀect between monotonicity and truth value in the case of numerical quantiﬁers. This eﬀect
follows from the corresponding diﬀerences in their computational complexity. Moreover, neither our
theory nor the experiments indicate an involvement of monotonicity in the diﬃculty of proportional
quantiﬁer veriﬁcation. These observations allow suggesting that monotonicity has only a relative eﬀect
on the diﬃculty of veriﬁcation. Together with other aspects of the situation, monotonicty may inﬂuence
the complexity of the veriﬁcation.
In a syllogistic reasoning experiment, [4] has found that if the monotonicity proﬁles of two quanti-fying expressions are the same, then they should be equally hard to process. They studied sentences
like:
(1) Some of the sopranos sang with more than three of the tenors.
(2) None of the sopranos sang with fewer than three of the tenors.
(3) Some of the sopranos sang with fewer than three of the tenors.
The results suggested that sentences with two upward monotone quantiﬁers, like (1), are easier to
reason with than sentences with two downward monotone quantiﬁers, e.g., (2). While sentences with
two quantiﬁers of diﬀerent monotonicity, for instance sentence (3), are the hardest. According to
our experiments, in the veriﬁcation tasks, quantiﬁers with the same monotonicity proﬁles can diﬀer
with respect to their diﬃculty depending on the truth-value. This suggest that there might be crucial
diﬀerences between reasoning with quantiﬁers and quantiﬁer veriﬁcation and that future studies devoted
to monotonicity should control the true-false conditions and include them in the analyses.
Moreover, our results complement the proposal put forward in [5] that the counting stage in pro-
cessing is aﬀected by the number mentioned in the quantiﬁer, rather than the critical number of objects
needed to verify the statement. They reported a real time study of veriﬁcation procedures for numerical
quantiﬁers, like ‘more than n’ and ‘fewer than n’, using self-paced counting. The used methodology is
an analogue of well-known self-paced reading experiments. Subjects hear a sentence and are asked to
determine as fast and as reliably as possible its truth-value relative to an array of dots. The arrays are
presented as three scattered rows of hexagonal plates. As participants press the space bar, the dots are
uncovered in groups of 1, 2, or 3, while previously seen dots are recovered and masked. Participants
may answer once they have enough information. The setting allows looking into the veriﬁcation pro-
cess by timing how the participants uncover the dots. Using this paradigm, [5] was able to show that
reaching the number heard in the quantiﬁer causes a slow down in the processing. This observation
is consistent with our data emphasizing the interaction with the truth-value, as changes in the truth-
value are necessarily bound with reaching the number n. This also suggests that next to the reading
and veriﬁcation stages, one should also take into account the decision stage in quantiﬁer veriﬁcation.
1
One would predict that the interactions among all three processing stages: reading, veriﬁcation, and
decision, may, for instance, play a crucial role in explaining the diﬀerences between comparative quan-
tiﬁers, e.g., ‘more than 3’ and the equivalent superlative quantiﬁers, e.g., ‘at least 4’. We know that
superlative quantiﬁers are harder to verify than the corresponding comparative quantiﬁers but there
are no diﬀerences in reading times [3]. Our computational approach predicts no diﬀerences in the ver-
iﬁcation times as the counting processes for equivalent quantiﬁers are identical, i.e., the computations
for ‘more than 3’ and ‘at least 4’ do not diﬀer in complexity. Therefore, we would predict that the
diﬀerence between comparative and superlative quantiﬁers is due to the decision stage. This prediction
falls outside the scope of the current work but should be tested in the future experiments.
1Interestingly, [5] chose the quantiﬁers in a way that no matter whether the sentence was true or false, the
subjects always needed to count only up to seven, i.e., the number heard, n, varied across true and false items,
e.g., ‘more than six’ (true) but ‘more than seven’ (false) and ‘fewer than eight’ (true) but ‘fewer than seven’
(true). As a result they found out that monotone increasing quantiﬁers are quicker to verify than falsify and
monotone decreasing quantiﬁers are quicker to falsify than verify.References
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